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I. Introduction
Worldwide privatization of the telecommunications  industry and the introduction of
competition  in the  sector, altogether  with the ever-increasing  rate of technological
advance in  telecommunications, raise new and critical challenges for regulation. For
matters of pricing, universal  service obligation  (regulation  required to boost industry
growth  in areas  not currently  served  or to maintain  provision  to areas  in danger  of losing
it) and the like, one of the key questions to be answered is: "What is the efficient 2 cost of
providing  the service  to a certain  area  or type  of customer?"
As developing  countries  move  forward  with their  efforts  to build  up their capacity  to
regulate their privatized infrastructure  monopolies,  cost models are likely to prove
increasingly  important  for several  reasons.  First,  an independent  ability  for regulators  to
assess  costs can remove  information  asymmetries  from the process  of crafting  efficient
regulation.  Second,  independent  cost estimates  can increase  transparency  and may be
helpful in reducing  the risks of corruption  that may exist in designing  or reviewing
pricing and subsidy policies. Finally, cost models may help in the development  of
infrastructure  buildout policy by identifying  cost differences  across regions of the
country.
Costs  models  deliver  a number  of benefits  to a regulator  willing  to apply them, but
they also  ask for  something in  advance: information. Without this vital  element no
answer  can be given  to the question  posed  above.  In the remainder  of this paper we will
introduce cost models and establish their applicability  when different degrees of
information  are available  to the regulator.  We  accomplish  the latter  by running  the model
with different  sets  of actual  data from  Argentina's  second  largest  city and comparing  the
results.
The paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  II deals  with the proper  definition  of costs
and their  measurement.  Section  III presents  the FCC  model  for cost assessment  in detail,
while  Section  IV discusses  the data  required  to implement  it. Section  V concludes.3
II. Costs and Their Measurement:  A Digression
Which costs are we talking about?
The regulator  must decide  on the relevant  definition  of costs  to be considered  in cost
models when answering  the question in the first paragraph of this paper. First, a
distinction  should  be made between  economic  and accounting  costs. Economic  cost is
about opportunity cost, i.e., the reward the factors of production involved in the provision
of the service would  obtain in their best alternative  use. As stated in Atkinson  et al.
(1997), firms make decisions  based on prices and economic  costs; in particular, in
dynamic,  competitive  markets  like  telecommunications,  firms  base  their decisions  on the
relationship  between  prices and  forward-looking  economic  costs, so this is the relevant
definition  of economic  costs to be considered.  Forward-looking  economic  costs are the
costs which  would  be incurred  if a new service  were to be provided,  or avoided  if an
existing  service's provision  were to be ceased,  assuming  that all inputs  of the firm can
vary freely (thus the term 'forward-looking'  or 'long-run'). Considering  the long-run
economic  cost ensures that the firm recovers  all of its costs, not only operating and
maintenance  costs (which vary in the short run), but also fixed investments  costs,
necessary  inputs  in the provision  of the service  (which  are  not variable  in the short  run).
If market  (or regulated)  prices  in a competitive  framework  exceed  long-run  economic
costs,  new  providers  will be attracted  to the market,  and  this entrance  would  be efficient.
If market (or regulated)  prices fall short of economic  costs, no new competitor  would
have an incentive  to enter the market,  and some  incumbent  firms may decide  to leave.
These  voluntary  actions  of the firms  in a competitive  market  achieve  an efficient  resource
allocation  by adjusting  price  or output  until  the value  to consumers  of additional  output  is
equal  to the additional  costs  incurred  in its production  (incremental  costs).
Accounting costs, on  the other hand, are historical costs (embedded costs) as
registered  in the books of a firm,  and pricing  based  on embedded  costs would  normally
fail to  make the connection between economic costs and prices, thus leading to
inefficiencies  in the allocation  of resources. Moreover,  it is likely  to be inconvenient  to
2 Firns  should not be paid for their inefficiencies.4
base prices or universal service obligation subsidies on information in the hands of the
firms themselves (the well-known problem of asymmetric information). Only forward-
looking economic costs can give operators in the market the right signals for entry,
investment and innovation.
Thus, international regulation has reached a consensus: the relevant definition of costs
is the economic concept of long-run incremental  costs3. Regrettably, the same consensus
has not been reached over the appropriate  approach to measure such costs.
How can regulators measure costs in practice?
The accounting auditing approach to cost assessment is by far the best known and the
least information-demanding  and time-consuming  methodology. Accounting information
is readily available to the regulator. The accounting approach relies on embedded costs
recorded in the companies' books, so a regulation based on this methodology would be
close  to  a  cost-plus  regulation, providing  little  incentives to  the  firms  for  cost
minimization. Thus, productive efficiency would be thwarted. Moreover, assessing cost
on the basis of historical data would lead to allocative  inefficiency, as we stated above.
Another problem with the accounting approach is that it  is based exclusively on
information  provided by the firms, with no independent checking. This is typically all the
information  that the license or the regulator himself asks the companies for, and it should
be  clear after the  former discussion that it is not  enough, if  the regulator wants to
minimize the asymmetric information problem and the informational rents the firms can
earn. So, to improve regulation, more information  is needed. Because the firm will have
no incentives on its own to reduce the asymmetry of information, the regulator should
make an effort to collect information beyond accounting data. This will allow him to
implement a cost proxy methodology that could enhance cost assessment for various
regulatory purposes.
The alternative to accounting methodologies is to use simulation exercises, varying
mainly technology and market parameters, which rely much less on historical data (see
stated in  Benitez et  al.  (1999) ).  These  alternative methodologies provide  a  non-5
discretionary framework within which regulators and firms can discuss with a significant
degree of objectivity, and which could provide an independent  check on the accuracy of
firms' cost studies. However, lunch is not free: these alternative  approaches require much
more time and effort in both data collection and preparation as well as the time and effort
spent on model design. Since accuracy only comes at a cost (the cost of information),
there  will  normally  exist  a  tradeoff;  we  will  discuss when  these  approaches are
worthwhile, depending on the information  at hand.
In their paper, Benitez et al. (1999) classify the proposed methodologies into two
broad categories:  financial models (as used in the UK and Australia) and engineering-
economic models (as used in the USA). Both approaches agree on defining the relevant
costs for regulation as incremental costs. The former 4 approaches focus on the overall
financial performance of the firm with and without providing service to certain areas or
customers (or groups of areas or groups of customers), thus concentrating  on the costs the
firm would avoid if it were to  cease providing the service (avoidable costs) and the
revenues it would  stop receiving (foregone revenues). The  analysis also takes into
account a variety of factors that may indirectly affect the financial performance of the
firm. According to this approach, there are universal service costs when the revenues
generated by  a  customer or a  group of customers are insufficient to  meet the costs
incurred by the universal service provider in providing the service to that customer or
group of customers. Thus, to evaluate if a user is profitable or not, it is necessary to
compare the long-term avoidable costs for the provider of service to that user and the
foregone revenue. Long-term avoidable costs include the operating costs, depreciation
and a reasonable return for the capital used.  "Long-term" means the period of time in
which all the assets are replaced. Then considering long-term costs implies that all the
capital equipment costs that the universal service provider would stop needing, should it
disconnect the service to the user, shall be included in  the analysis. This is deemed
appropriate since the universal service obligation influences the investment decisions of
the universal service provider. Due to the fact that the long-term avoidable cost is an
economic concept, the appropriate approach to  evaluate the assets should be that of
3Plus  certain  arrangements  so as to protect  investments  already  made.
4 See Oftel (1995, 1997).6
considering the asset replacement cost, such as is considered, for example, in current
costs accounting  (CCA).
The measure of  the long-term avoidable cost obtained from the cost information
submitted by the universal service provider will give the costs incurred by that operator.
However, it is not necessarily the case that this measure represents an efficient degree of
avoidable  costs. In the event that a finance mechanism  is determined, the other operators
should not  have to  pay  for the universal service provider's  inefficiency. Thus,  an
efficiency adjustment must be applied to the long-term avoidable costs incurred so as to
obtain an estimate of the efficient level of costs. 5
The financial approach uses the proper definition of  costs, and introduces some
interesting concepts into the analysis of the universal service burden (like the indirect
financial benefits of being a universal service provider). It seems, though, that financial
models share some of the undesirable properties of historical embedded cost (HEC)
models (accounting auditing approach). Both types of models rely on firm-reported  cost
data; the major difference is that the financial model uses a  current cost accounting
methodology  rather than the HEC standard. 6
Engineering-economic  models  have been developed in recent years as an alternative  to
the traditional econometric and accounting approaches to cost assessment. Engineering
models offer a more detailed view of cost structures than is possible using econometric
data. The engineering models (also known as cost proxy  models) could enable the
regulator to estimate the forward-looking  economic cost of the service without having to
rely on detailed cost studies that otherwise would be necessary. Proxy models can be
useful for many regulatory purposes, such as determining levels of universal service
support  in  high  cost  areas and  the  pricing  of  unbundled network  elements (e.g.
interconnection).  An economic cost proxy model begins with an engineering  model of the
physical local exchange network, and then makes a detailed set of assumptions about
' For the case of BT (British Telecom),  the scope of the efficiency adjustment  was taken from the analysis
and the assumptions  used by Oftel in the tariff revision for BT.
6 Financial models and engineering-economic  models should  not be seen as rival approaches, but rather as
complementary methodologies. For example, the avoidable costs mentioned above could be  estimated
through a cost proxy model.7
input prices and other factors. The next sections explore in more detail the underlying
structure of one such model and its input requirements.
III. The FCC Approach
The Federal Communications  Commission  (FCC) of the U.S.A. 7 has analyzed the use
of  forward-looking  economic cost methodologies  as the basis to determine the universal
service cost, and it has concluded that the models that are being used are promising
regulatory tools. The major actors in the telecommunications industry in the U.S.A.
submitted their own versions of forward-looking  models to the FCC for the Commission
to analyze them. These models are the Cost Proxy Model (CPM) of Pacific Blue and
INDETEC International; the Benchmark Cost Model 2 (BCM2) of Sprint and US West;
and the Hatfield Model (Hatfield) in different versions, of AT&T and MCI. The FCC
developed and adopted a model as an alternative  to the models proposed by the industry
players. The FCC model, known as Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (or HCPM), combines
appropriate principles  of  engineering design  for  different  network  elements  with
economic principles of cost minimization. 8 The model draws freely from engineering
principles displayed in other models,  thus the term 'hybrid'.
In what follows, we describe the most relevant features of the cost proxy model
approach. We give an  overview of  the HCPM and  leave the  discussion on  input
requirements  and data problems  to the next section.
Structure of the HCPM 9
The 14CPM has from the beginning been designed to use  sources of geocodedl'
customer location data. The model can also handle Census block level data  as an
alternative source  of  publicly available data.  The last  version  of  the  FCC model
incorporates some minor modifications to improve the performance of the model under
7See  Atkinson  et al. (1997).
' See Bush et al. (1998).
9  This part follows Bush et al. (1998).8
the expectation that it will ultimately be used with a source of geocoded data (we will
return to this issue in the next section).
The most recent release of the HCPM also contains a clustering module that explicitly
incorporates  optimization  routines as part of the clustering  formation  process (see below),
and allows the user to choose from three different clustering algorithms. The HCPM
currently consists of two independent  modules: a customer location module and a loop
design module.
Customer  location module. The local exchange telephone  network must connect every
customer to a local central office switch. A critical component in the design of such a
network is the definition of a  'serving area', which consists of a group of customers
served from a common  remote terminal.  Then feeder plant connects  every serving area to
the central office and distribution plant connects every customer in a serving area to a
'serving area interface'. The customer location  module first groups  individual geographic
locations of  customers into  clusters, to  form  serving  areas based  on  engineering
considerations.  These considerations  include a distance constraint, so that no customer is
farther from a  potential terminal location than is allowed by the maximum copper
distance, and the maximum  number  of customers  in a serving area, which depends on the
capacity of the largest terminal.
A divisive clustering algorithm successively  splits new clusters from a main cluster
that initially contains every customer location. Clusters are evaluated on the basis of the
relative distance of customers from the line-weighted centroid of the  new and old
clusters. After an initial clustering process,  two different optimization  algorithms look for
ways to re-assign customers  to clusters, so as to reduce the total distance from the cluster
centroids, while satisfying  the maximum  distance  constraints.
After geocoded customer locations have been grouped into clusters, it is necessary to
further process the location data, so that they can be used by the loop design module.
HCPM defines a grid on top of every cluster and then subdivides each grid into a large
10  To geocode a customer  or a wire center location (or any location), a coordinate (latitude-longitude)  must
be attached to that particular location (e.g., the customer's address).9
number of microgrid cells, placing each customer  location  into the correct microgrid cell.
Loop plant can therefore be designed  to reach only populated microgrid  cells.
Loop design module. Distribution  plant consists of the set of analog cables, structures
and other facilities, such as network interface devises, that are required to connect every
customer location  to the nearest serving area interface (SAI). Feeder  plant consists of the
set of fiber, digital copper (Ti) or analog copper cables and structure that connect every
SAI to the central office. When there is more than one SAI, the model identifies a
primary SAI, the one located  closest to the central office.
The feeder network, which connects every primary SAI to  the central office, is
designed using a 'minimum cost spanning tree' algorithm,  modified to take into account
the cost of cable and structures rather than simple distance. Beginning at the central
office, the algorithm builds a network sequentially by examining both the cable and
structure costs involved in attaching new nodes to the network. Lowest cost nodes are
attached first.  When each new node is attached, the connection is  chosen so as to
minimize the cost of cable and structures that are required to connect that node to the
central office using the currently existing network. Distance computation can be done
using rectilinear distance or airline distance. In addition, 'junction nodes' are placed at
points due north, south, east and west of the central office along what would be the main
feeder routes in a traditional 'pine tree' feeder design.
In  calculating the cost of the distribution network, HCPM employs two separate
algorithms.  One  algorithm  deploys  vertical  backbone  and  horizontal  branching
distribution cables from the serving area interface to reach every populated microgrid.
Branching cables  run  along  every other  microgrid  boundary. Each  microgrid  is
subdivided  into equal-sized  lots.  Drop  terminals are located to serve one to four lots and
cables are placed  on  every other lot boundary to  connect with the backbone and
branching cable leading to the SAI. The second distribution algorithm uses the same
minimum cost spanning tree network as was used to design the feeder network. In this
approach, microgrids are divided into lots and drop terminal locations are determined as
before. A spanning tree network is then constructed which connects every drop terminal10
to  its  nearest SAI.  All  distance computations used  in  constructing the  distribution
network are based on rectilinear  distance.
The HCPM incorporates a  number of  explicit optimization routines in  both  the
distribution and feeder algorithms. It selects the appropriate feeder technology (fiber,
digital T-1 on copper, or analog copper) on the basis of cost minimization subject to
engineering  constraints defined by user inputs. The model also selects loop electronics by
examining every feasible combination of large and small terminals and selecting the cost-
minimizing outcome. In the feeder network, the model optimally determines whether to
splice two fiber cables or run multiple cables at each junction point.  All technology
decisions are made on the basis of life cycle costs, based on a table of technology specific
annual cost factors.
In this way, the loop design module determines the total investment required for an
optimal distribution and feeder network by building loop plant to the designated customer
locations represented by populated microgrid cells.
Applicability" 1
A key concern in developing countries is the importance of ensuring that the poor
users or regions get access to services. These concerns are typically built in through the
inclusion of service obligations in the concession or other types of privatization contracts
signed between the governments and the private operators. The main challenge for the
regulators is to ensure that the financing requirements claimed by the operators do not
result in  excess profits  or  grossly inefficient cross subsidies. An independent cost
modeling approach can be a significant advantage in addressing this concern. For low-
income build-out programs and universal service initiatives, the unbiasedness property
thwarts the 'cost-plus' inefficiency inherent in using accounting costs, since cash outlays
are not based on monetary claims under the recipient's control. Because the HCPM
approach involves economic optimization,  the programs will be delivered at a lower cost
(or level of subsidy) than the alternatives when comparable input values are used. The
following table compares the HCPM with the more traditional accounting approach.
" More  on  the topics  in  the remainder  of this  Section  can be found  in Sharkey  et al. (1999).11
Applications  Accounting  HCPM
Approach
Access!  Leads to application Flexibility  limited only
Interconnection of wholesale  rates  by computing  time that
instead of  the user can tolerate.
incremental  cost
based rates.
Universal  Impossible  to  Flexible and unbiased.




Price Cap  Will understate  Greater optimization
Review  efficiency  gains by  allows substitution
over-weighting  among inputs, though
historical  data.  not perfect.
Poverty  Leads  to "cost-plus" Can lead to balanced,




Unbundled  Accounting  data not  Flexible and unbiased.
Network  disaggregated  in
Elements  relevant  way.
Policy Objectives
The new regulators of infrastructure  services  in developing countries  have a number of
underlying objectives to meet. Among these objectives are the need to set independent
benchmarks for  cost-based regulation. Such  independence is  desirable  from  the
perspectives of avoiding the pitfalls of cost-plus reward structures and of avoiding the
undue influence of any one industry group on policy decisions. Benchmarks developed
using the HCPM approach avoid both pitfalls.
Another objective is maintaining control of information used in policy applications.
The HCPM approach guarantees  that all data input to the model are generated in a public
process in which all parties are invited to participate.12
A third objective is to  enhance the transparency of cross-subsidies embedded in
pricing schemes.  The HCPM is likely to be the most accurate of the approaches, since it
incorporates economic optimization and thus will calculate more accurate estimates of
the costs of networks delivering subsets  of the services provided by a complete network
(stand-alone costs). Such computations  are necessary for determining the presence and
amount of cross-subsidies.  Once again, we present a table where both the HCPM and the
accounting  methodologies  are shown together.
Policy  Accounting  HCPM
Objectives  Approach
Benchmarking Accounting  models do All sides can
not set independent  recognize
benchmarks.  independent
benchmarks.
Information  Determined  by  Determined  by public
Control  accounting  rules.  data inputs.
Cross-Subsidy Accounting  models do Greater  optimization
Transparency  not enable  calculation improves  estimate of
of stand-alone  costs;  cross-subsidies.
thus, subsidies  cannot
be calculated.
Theoretical  validity
The  credibility of  any  model  proposed for  policymaking is  determined by  the
adherence of the model to theoretical precepts. Such precepts include the realism of the
model's treatment of customer locations, the incorporation  of economic optimization,  and
the usefulness of the model for calculating  true long-run  incremental costs.
The HCPM accepts fully disaggregated  customer location data and "builds" plant to
individual customer locations, as  mentioned in  earlier sections of  this  paper. This
characteristic helps in convincing skeptics who feel that cost models build "fantasy"
networks, and is likely to result in more realistic cost estimates.  Accounting models have
no provision for handling customer locations on a prospective basis, since they can only
model costs that have already been incurred. Moreover, they do not incorporate any13
significant degree  of  economic decision-making in  the  model  and  overstate  the
incremental  costs of services,  since inherent in the approach is a non-economic  allocation
ofjoint and common cost.
Limitations
HCPM also has some limitations. First of all, HCPM is unable to model a dynamically
evolving  telecommunications network. Such  a  model,  involving complex  dynamic
optimization techniques, is likely to be quite computationally expensive and is beyond
the current ability of cost modelers to develop. Given this shortcoming, HCPM may
provide a second-best advantage in that it optimizes more significantly than the other
approaches, and one can therefore use the HCPM  to calculate an optimal  static network at
various points of time  in order to  approximate certain dynamic considerations. This
repeated static exercise will not result in an optimal time path for the network (since it
always "rebuilds" the network from scratch), but is an improvement  over the alternatives
that do no optimization  at all.
Another limitation that the HCPM presents is a failure to model the labor input in a
detailed way. Accounting approaches  may be somewhat  better in this dimension, since if
the data are available one can observe a time path of labor cost, perhaps by activity type.
However, a well-designed  industry or independently  designed  proxy model can make use
of this information  in order to appropriately  calibrate input values.
Both approaches also share the limitation that economic depreciation information is
not  generally available.  Conceivably, information requests  may  lead  to  economic
depreciation information  being available over time. Accounting-based  approaches have a
clear advantage in terms of current data availability and in their treatment of stranded
investments. The forward-looking  investment data necessary to use the HCPM can be
difficult to  collect, necessitating a  large amount of  staff time.  Accounting models
inherently handle stranded investments, since they  are  inherently retrospective. Of
course, it is a matter of some debate in many circumstances whether such investments
actually exist or are a significant  proportion of total plant; to the extent they are, proxy
model approaches must be adjusted to account for stranded investments if necessary for
the regulatory objective.14
IV. How Much Data Does a Regulator Really Need?
Data Requirements
A main concern in most reforming developing countries is the limited access to data.
This implies that a careful assessment of the data capacity of a regulator is probably the
first stage in the development  of a toolkit for any regulator. The following table'2 shows
the input requirements  of the HCPM, compared  to those in the accounting  approach.
Data  Accounting  HCPM
Requirements Approach
Customer  data  Only aggregate  Uses and processes
historical  data used.  data at any level of
aggregation.
Input Prices  Highly aggregated;  Highly
not forward looking; disaggregated  input
accounting  data possible.
categories  not
relevant  to economic
issues.
Engineering  Engineering  inputs  Based on network
other than historical  optimization
experience  not  principles;  can
possible.  design to variety of
engineering
standards.
Time to  Accounting  data  Logic available
implement  available  now in  now; inputs may
many countries, but  require six months
not in others.  or more.
Most typically, regulators of privatized utilities will start from scratch and initially
have only a very modest source of information  to work with. As regulators build on this
information, they will need to consider  the policy issues that they will ultimately have to
address. These issues will determine the form of the best cost model for regulatory
purposes and therefore should determine  the optimal degree of disaggregation  to impose
on the data collection process. A significant advantage of a flexible model such as the
HCPM model is its ability to accommodate  various levels of input data disaggregation.
12 Reproduced  from Sharkey  et al. (1999).15
Useful results can be obtained initially with relatively aggregated  Census level inputs, but
the same modeling engine is able to accept  the most disaggregated  customer  location data
that can be provided. Other inputs representing  the costs of best international  practice in
specific areas can also be derived from current values used in the HCPM since these are
driven by technology rather than local conditions. At a later time, these inputs can be
customized  to fit local conditions  as required.
But, what is the usefulness for regulation of cost proxy models like the HCPM?
Several questions arise in this context: What is the least information a regulator should
have at hand if he is to trust the results given by the model? What is there to be gained if
better data is available? What can the regulator do with certain qualities of information?
Precision will normally pay, so it is likely to be convenient  to make some investment  in
data collection and elaboration.
We mentioned that the HCPM had been designed with the expectation that it would
ultimately be used with a source of geocoded data (i.e. geocoded customer location data
or Census block level data). But does lack of geocoded locations imply that the model
cannot be applied? The answer to the question is no (with some qualifications).  If a map
of the study area were available, a grid could be placed on top of it, and blocks could be
constructed,  where each would be given a location in the grid. In this most primitive case
(least  information  case),  we assume that only the total number of residential  and business
lines for each wire center, locations of the wire centers, and a fairly detailed country or
regional map are available. We assume that a user is capable of manually "gridding" the
map, creating a matrix in which areas that appear from the map to be populated are given
the value '1'  and areas which appear not to be populated are given the value '0'.  Each
populated mesh in the grid is assumed to have the same number of lines and the same
area; these data are converted via a straightforward computer program into input files
usable by HCPM. The program assigns each populated mesh block to the nearest wire
center as measured by earth surface distance between the coordinates of the mesh block
and the switch.
Alternatively, another minimum information case might be one in which the wire
center locations are known and customer locations are known at a more aggregate level;16
that is, very imprecisely (intermediate  information case 1). We have implemented this
possible scenario using Census data for the second largest city of Argentina" 3 at the level
of the.ftacci6n, which is a collection of radios, which in turn is a collection of manzanas,
the smallest reporting unit available.' 4 We have also computed  costs when information  is
available at the level of the radio. The results of this thought experiment  can be seen in
Table 1.
Another intermediate  information  example (intermediate  information  case 2) might be
one, as in Argentina, in which the wire center locations are known, line totals are known,
and location data are known at the level of the manzana. The relatively disaggregated
location data are used to  impute a  more uneven customer location distribution by
assigning the lines in the wire center proportionally  to the populations  of each manzana.
The results of the computations  for this particular  case can also be seen in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Total Investment  (in dollars)
[Total lines  Manzana  Radio  Fracci6n
1  320,403  215,032,106  216,802,535  233,801,440
The total investment shown in the table is the sum of feeder costs, distribution costs,
drop costs and some other costs (e.g., terminals, interfaces). 15 As can be readily seen
from the table, the use of relatively aggregated Census data does not markedly bias the
results with respect to what we take to be the best approximation to the true cost, i.e.
interrnediate  inforrnation  case 2 (manzana).  Note that using radio there are no significant
differences in total investment  (less than 1% higher), and using  fracci6n, total investment
is only 9% higher than with manzana (our best estimate of the true cost, at least with
Census data).
The best situation regarding  data availability  would be one in which costs calculations
could be performed having nearly perfect information available on precise individual
1
3 A brief description of the database used for these exercises  can be found in the appendix.
14 Those familiar  with the U.S. Census data reporting  conventions  can think of the manzana as analogous  to
the Census  block, and the radio  as equivalent  to the Census  block group, or CBG.
15 Total investment  does not include maintenance,  depreciation  and cost of capital charges, among others.17
customer locations (maximum information case). The telephone companies  could provide
such a database, in which customer addresses  could be geocoded using a standard GIS
package, like ArcView&. Each location could then be mapped using a simple custom
computer program  to the nearest  wire center location.
Should this kind of information  not be available, the regulator could resort to Census
data at any level of (dis)aggregation  (as discussed  above). The question remains whether
this would be a good substitute for the precise individual customer locations. To show
that it could be so (at least in populated areas),  we considered  two wire centers (A and B)
of Argentina's second largest city and compared  the results using the geocoded locations
of the customers' 6 served by those wire centers (geo-A and geo-B) with the results when
Census data (manzana level) corresponding  to the area served by them is used (census-A
and census-B).  The estimates  are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Total lines  Total  Average
Investment Investment
(in dollars) (in dollars)
Census-A  1,716  1,257,492  733
Geo-A  1,216,582  709
Census-B  5,169  3,113,898  602
Geo-B  2,964,068  573
The table shows that there are no large differences between both data sources, so in
principle, Census data could be used whenever geocoded customer locations are not
available. Moreover, if the regulator wishes to measure the costs of serving a currently
non-served area,  she would have to  resort to  information from  the  Census, since
customers  do not exist by definition.
V. Conclusions
Cost proxy models are promising regulatory tools, which can be used to assess the
efficient cost of providing telephone  services.  These models could enable the regulator to
16 The source and description  of this kind of information  is also given in the appendix.18
estimate the forward-looking economic cost of the service without having to rely on
detailed cost studies that otherwise would be necessary. This alternative methodology
provides a non-discretionary  framework within which regulators and firms can discuss
with a significant  degree of objectivity, and which could provide an independent check
on the accuracy of firms'  cost studies. However, lunch is not free: these alternative
approaches require much more time and effort in both data collection and preparation as
well as the time and effort spent on model design.
In general, reliable and detailed information  (as required by costs models) is a scarce
good in developing countries.  In this paper we have established  the minimum information
requirements  that a regulator needs to implement a cost proxy model approach, and we
have shown that this 'data constraint' need not be that binding. In particular, the HCPM
can run with the following  inputs:
*  Census data. Each unit surveyed in the Census (e.g. Census block, or Census block
group) should be referenced to a system of coordinates (e.g. latitude and longitude;
nevertheless,  the mrodel  can be modified to work with another system -even with an
Excel worksheet- when latitude and longitude coordinates are not available). There
should be information  on the number of households in each Census unit, and on the
number of units in a Census  unit group.
*  Location of wire centers. Each wire center in the study area should be referenced  to
a system of coordinates (e.g. latitude and longitude; nevertheless, the model can be
modified to work with another system -even with an Excel worksheet- when latitude
and longitude coordinates are not available). There should be  information on the
number  of lines provided by each of the wire centers.  The telephone companies  could
provide  this information.
*  All other inputs are provided by the model (i.e. factor prices, technologies, etc.),
based on information  for the US, but can be freely varied by the regulator when this
information  becomes available  in the country.
We have also shown that Census data is a good substitute for the individual customer
locations, and that the level of aggregation  of the Census information  does not markedly19
alter the estimates. Geocoded customer  locations may prove difficult for the regulator to
obtain, but aggregated  Census data is likely to be available in most developing countries,
making cost proxy models easier to apply to their particular realities.
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Appendix
The information  needed to run the exercises  presented above involves customer data,
wire center data, and parameters (both technological  and economic). We describe here
our sources and the database  itself
*  Customer data. The information  on the particular customer locations was provided
by the provider of telephone services in the study area (Telecom de Argentina). It
contained, for each customer, her complete  address and the wire center to which she
was connected. The distribution of lines (customers)  by wire center is given in Table
Al  below. Each customer location was geocoded using ArcView®, a standard GIS
package. The alternative  source of customer information  was Census data. This data
were obtained from INDEC,  Argentina's office of statistics and census. This database
contained information  from the 1991 Census on households and small businesses, at20
the level of the manzana; and on large businesses, at the level of the radio. We
assumed a homogeneous  distribution of these large businesses among the manzanas
that form a radio. Table A2 below gives a description  of the Census  data used.
*  Wire center data. This information  was also provided by the company, containing,
for each wire center, its location (address)  and type (host, remote). Some wire centers
were located in the same building. We just added these up and take them to be a
single (larger) wire center to perform the estimations. Table A3 shows how these
groups of wire centers were formed.
*  Parameters.  All the information  on costs and technology was taken from FCC's web
site (www.fcc.gov).21
.
Table Al:  Distribution  of lines by wire  center
Wire  Number  Wire  Number  Wire  Number  Wire  Number
Center  of Lines  Center  of Lines  Center  of Lines  Center  of Lines
2  8,650  71  1,760  9  3,340
21  21,545  57  2,973  75  508  94  7,797
22  6,920  60  5,944  76  8,885  96  832
23  4,436  61  8,477  77  899  97  5,829
24  3,530  62  1  78  8,954  297  18
25  3,002  64  7,638  79  826  901  96
26  1,187  65  9,017  80  10,276  902  153
27  98  66  3,180  81  8,895  904  78
28  638  68  3,204  82  2,653  990  836
33  437  69  2,297  84  8,055  993  178
51  9,600  70  6,603  85  80  995  415
52  6,952  71  9,784  88  5,653  997  795
53  347  72  4,881  89  7,492  998  455
55  9,641  73  3,656  92  3,306  999  169
. Total  233,87322
Table A2: Census data
Unit  type  Number of  Number of
units  manzanas
Viviendas  290,708  12,172
Locales Comerciales  30,233  8,106
Total  320,941  12,712
Table  A3: Wire  Center  Groups
Number
Group  Wire Centers  of lines
1--T  71-72-73-74  20,071
2  51-52-53  16,888
3 (A)  81-82  11,575
4  20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-33  41,447
5  80-88-89  23,488
6  70  7,071
7  78-79  9,967
8  60-68-69  11,537
9  75-76-77  9,505
10  61  8,663
11  84-85  8,618
12  65-66  12,337
13  55-56-57  21,481
14 (B)  64  8,078
15  97  5,869
16  92  2,911
17  997  834
18  93-94  9,182
19  999  134
Total  46 wire centers  229,696Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2365  Leading  Indicator  Project:  Lithuania  Stephen  S. Everhart  June  2000  M. Geller
Robert  Duval-Hernandez  85155
WPS2366 Fiscal  Constraints.  Collection  Costs,  Keiko Kubota  June  2000  L.  Tabada
and Trade  Policies  36896
WPS2367  Gender,  Poverty,  and Nonfarm  Constance  Newman  June  2000  M. Clarke
Employment  in Ghana  and Uganda  Sudharshan  Canagarajan  31752
WPS2368 Seeds  of Corruption:  Do Market  Harry  G. Broadman  June  2000  S.  Craig
Institutions  Matter?  Francesca  Racanatini  33160
WPS2369 How  the Proposed  Basel  Guidelines  Giovanni  Ferri  June  2000  E. Mekhova
On Rating-Agency  Assessments  Li-Gang  Liu  85984
Would  Affect  Developing  Countries  Giovanni  Majnoni
WPS2370 A New  Model  for Market-Based  Marcelo  Giugale  June  2000  M.  Geller
Regulation  of Subnational  Borrowing: Adam  Korobow  85155
The Mexican  Approach  Steven  Webb
WPS2371 Shock  Persistence  and the Choice  Marcelo  Giugale  June  2000  M.  Geller
of Foreign  Exchange  Regime:  An  Adam  Korobow  85155
Empirical  Note  from  Mexico
WPS2372 Financial  Openness,  Democracy,  Mansoor  Dailami  June 2000  W.  Nedrow
and Redistributive  Policy  31585
WPS2373 Reciprocity  across  Modes  of Supply  Aaditya  Mattoo  June  2000  L.  Tabada
in the World  Trade  Organization:  Marcelo  Olarreaga  36896
A Negotiating  Formula
WPS2374  Should  Credit  Be  Given  for  Aaditya  Mattoo  June  2000  L. Tabada
Autonomous  Liberalization  in  Marcelo  Olarreaga  36896
Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations?
WPS2375  Asset Distribution,  Inequality,  Klaus  Deininger  June 2000  M. Fernandez
and Growth  Pedro  Olinto  33766
WPS2376  The Effect  of Early  Childhood  Michael  M. Lokshin  June  2000  P. Sader
Development  Programs  on Women's  Elena  Glinskaya  33902
Labor  Force  Participation  and  Marito  Garcia
Older  Children's  Schooling  in Kenya
WPS2377 Reforming  the Water  Supply  in  Claude  Menard  June 2000  H. Sladovich
Abidjan,  C6te d'lvoire:  Mild  Reform  George  Clarke  37698
in a Turbulent  EnvironmentPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2378  Disintegration and Trade Flows:  Simeon Djankov  June 2000  R. Vo
Evidence from the Former Soviet  Caroline Freund  33722
Union
WPS2379  India  and the Multilateral Trading  Aaditya Mattoo  June 2000  L. Tabada
System after Seattle: Toward a  Arvind Subramanian  36896
Proactive Role
WPS2380 Trade Policies for Electronic  Aaditya Mattoo  June 2000  L. Tabada
Commerce  Ludger Schuknecht  36896
WPS2381  Savings and the Terms of Trade  Pierre-Richard Agenor  June 2000  T. Loftus
under Borrowing Constraints  Joshua Aizenman  36317
WPS2382  Impediments to the Development and  Thorsten Beck  June 2000  E. Mekhova
Efficiency of Financial Intermediation  85984
in Brazil
WPS2383  New Firm Formation  and Industry  Thorsten Beck  June 2000  E. Mekhova
Growth: Does Having a Market- or  Ross Levine  85984
Bank-Based System Matter?